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Article 9

'When did I begin?' Revisited
Rev. Anthony Fisher, O.P.

The author is an Australian bioethicist whose works include IVF: the
Critical Issues (Melbourne: Collins Dove, 1989). He completed degrees in
history and law at the University of Sydney, Australia. He was ordained in
1991 and will begin doctoral studies in moral philosophy at the University
of Oxford, England, later this year.
In When did I begin? Fr. Norman Ford ('F.') argued that there is no
human individual or soul present in the embryo until two or three weeks
after fertilization. The book was triply significant. First, it re-presented an
old opinion, 'delayed hominization', with more scientific documentation
than ever before. Secondly, it had major implications for several
contemporary moral dilemmas, such as the disposition of human embryos
and early abortion. Thirdly, it has become the favorite source cited by
proponents of human embryo experimentation, and thus has considerable
political and legal significance.
In 1989 Nicholas Tonti-Filippini presented in this journal the fullest of
the several critiques of F.'s book to appear so far. In 1990 F. replied, yet
surprisingly he barely touched on the criticisms Tonti-Filippini had made;
instead he restated in summary form the arguments used in his book. The
present study re-examines that debate.
Fr. Ford's science
One of the clearest virtues of When did I begin? is the rich collection of
biological information about early human development. F. claims or
assumes that these are uncontroversial'facts' which metaphysics then seeks
to interpret: in this he is very much in the mainstream of Baconianempiricist views of scientific method. Of course, even within this tradition
F. must contend with the almost unanimous conclusion of scientists despite being aware of all his biological data and more - that fertilization
in mammals normally represents the beginning of life for a new individual
member of that species.
But there is also a fundamental epistemological question begged here.
Modern philosophers of science have exposed some of the assumptions
behind naive inductivism and shown how illusory are the classical
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distinctions between fact and interpretation, neutral objective science and
committed subjective metaphysics. They have identified the "theorydependence of observation" and shown that the presumed objectivity ofthe
scientific observer actually reflects considerable personal involvement,
commitment and, accordingly, interpretation.
Had F. been more aware of contemporary philosophy of science, he
might have been more wary of the "expert tuition, advice and constant
encouragement" he says he received from leading embryo experimenters
[Axviii]. Honest embryo experimenters will have formed the view that the
embryo is not a human person, and their perceptions of "the facts" are likely
to be accordingly "value-laden".
Thus when F. asserts that "embryo technically refers to the stage from the
third to eighth week of development" and advocates the use of the term proor pre- embryo for the first two weeks [A21 0-2], he is adopting the linguistic
engineering of the pro-experimentation lobby. His own advisers, Short and
Trounson, testified before an Australian Senate Committee that they
regard these terms as quite arbitrary.
Again, F. presents the zona pellucid a, chorion and placental tissues as
"extra-embryonic" membranes, rather than parts or organs ofthe "embryo
proper" [A1l7-8,124,146,153,156-7,171,B64] - a claim which TontiFilippini rightly describes as "curious" (p. 41; cf. pp. 45-6). F.'s arguments
for this position (such as that they have no nerves and are insentient, or are
discarded after a time, or can be shared with a twin) would make most of the
human body not part of "the body proper". The biological evidence is
clearly that these tissues are formed by the embryo, usually with its genetic
constitution, and for its sole benefit and use, and are indeed its organs: they
are clearly not the mother's organs, nor a tumor, nor some alien third
organism living symbiotically with mother and embryo. F. argues that "it
would be a sufficient, but probably not a necessary, condition for an
individual human being to exist that it be a living body with the primordium
of at least one organ formed for the benefit ofthe whole organism" [A170]:
the zona pellucid a (and later the placental membranes) would seem to
satisfy F.'s own sufficient condition for the existence of an organism -from
conception.
F. asserts, again as a matter of biological fact, that despite their close
contact and the appearance of a single organism or unity, the several cells of
an embryo are really distinct organisms: the membranes of these cells
"merely touch", and in the early stages are held "loosely together" in "simple
contact" by gluey junctions and the "cage" of the protective zona pellucid a
[A125,137-9,146,B62]. Once more, little evidence is offered for this
interpretation, which runs quite contrary to the understanding of most
biologists, or of any ordinary viewer of photographs of a multi-cellular
embryo with the cells firmly pressed against each other, restricting each
other's shape and position.
Another example of "factual" information in F.'s book which is actually
quite controversial is that on monozygotic twinning. It is far from clear, for
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instance, that the trigger for identical twinning is environmental rather than
genetic [A 119,135]: presumably F. insists on this so as to exclude the view
that in twinning there are really two individuals present from conception.
N or is it as clear as F. claims that in twinning the original "parent" organism
ceases to exist in producing two new ones: it might instead be the case that
the original organism continues to exist as well as its genetically identical
"offspring". F. also claims that identical twinning can occur at any time
during and up to the first two weeks after conception [AI36,172-3,B63].
Some biologists, however, believe that "Siamese" twinning and the "foetusin-foetu" occur well after the implantation and primitive streak stage, up to
a month or so after fertilization; others suggest that it occurs much earlier
than previously assumed, and that the veterinary evidence from
embryogenesis in sheep and cattle, upon which F. and his sources rely" is
not applicable to human embryos.
Space precludes an examination of several other far from uncontroversial"scientific facts" presented in F. 's work . The examples that are given
here are offered simply as a warning to readers not to be intimidated into a
philosophical position by F.'s embryology. Overall his scientific data do not
support his denial of the organic individuality of the early embryo. We can
now turn to the philosophical justification for his position.
Fr. Ford's philosophy of science
F. rightly observes that the present debate must be inter-disciplinary,
involving philosophy, embryology and history. He describes his preferred
method as "philosophical induction": the inference of metaphysical
principles from an attentive analysis of the physical data known to
experience and observation. While he does not directly address how he
views the relationship between science and metaphysics, he insists that
"science is quite relevant even if philosophy is more important", or that
biological evidence leads to particular philosophical conclusions, or that
philosophical conclusions should be guided by or drawn from scientific
data.
Despite the accumulation of merely indicative biological data and the
justly tentative nature of his argument, generally couched in terms of
"seems" and "suggests", F. comes to a strong conclusion: the human
individual clearly begins after implantation; and persuasive philosophical
arguments, based on scientific evidence, show that there could not be an
individual before that stage; indeed that to support individuality from
conception would be "extremely difficult to maintain", "pointless", "quite
unreal" and "impossible to say with any plausibility". The problem with this
is that a multiplication of ifs can never produce such a strong and confident
must. The certainty with which F. presents his conclusion is not supported
by his argument. This may be due to a fundamental logical
misunderstanding: for F. (wrongly) asserts that inductive reasoning can
produce conclusive results and implies that the goal of science is to uncover
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and articulate the purposive "laws" of capital-N "Nature" [AI2,146,
155,176].
F. opposes disrespectful procedures involving the early embryo (except
in the case of rape? B65) and supports Catholic teaching that the benefit of
any reasonable doubt about the status of the embryo must be resolved by
treating it as a person from conception. But his "certain" conclusion
suggests that there is in fact no reasonable doubt upon which to base the
Catholic Church's argument from prudence (that the presence of human
soul in the embryo is sufficiently probable for prudence to require that it be
treated as a person). It cannot be probable and impossible at the same time!
No end to "philosophical induction" can ever resolve which c:riteria are
necessary and which sufficient for individuality. A fundamental weakness
of When did I begin? is that the relationship between empirical science and
metaphysics is never worked out. F. does, however, repeatedly have
recourse to "what children know", "common-sense realism", "ordinary
experience", "universal agreement" and what we "spontaneously recognize"
to resolve philosophical problems. This part-empirical, part-intuitive
source seems to form the bridge between science and metaphysics in his
theory.
But "common sense" and "common usage" are not always as helpful as
might first appear. At the edges of our understanding (such as the beginning
and the end of life), these authorities are at their most strained and
ambiguous. It is simply not the case that every ordinary person can identify
a human individual, as it were, from fifty paces. That is why there have at
various times been raging controversies over how we should treat Black,
Jewish, embryonic, unborn, anencephalic, severely handicapped or
persistently comatose people, as well as some animals and , perhaps in the
future, sophisticated artificial intelligences. The "common-sense understanding of ordinary people" has yielded all sorts of regrettable conclusions
in the past and is likely to do so in the present and the future . That is, in part,
why we bother with philosophical clarification of concepts and terms.
The present writer happens to agree entirely with F. in his opposition to
Dr. Peter Singer's position that the unborn, new-born, severely
handicapped, and comatose are not persons. But pleading that Singerism
does not accord with ordinary linguistic usage, or that "nobody" holds this
position, or that "people the world over" support the alternative, is unlikely
to convince its adherents. This is not, in the end, a philosophical argument
at all: it is sociology. Common sense and common usage fail to provide the
much-needed bridge between F.'s biological data and his metaphysics.
Fr. Ford's Aristotelianism
F. assumes the metaphysics, epistemology and anthropology of
Aristotle, Boethius and Aquinas: the human person is a psychosomatic
unity, a distinct living ontological individual with a truly human nature, and
an example of a common human nature which is known by abstraction
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from concrete examples.
F. describes well the erroneous classical biology upon which Aristotle
and Thomas based their metaphysical reflections. Radically new biological
data, such as we now have, might be expected to yield (or be met by) a
radically new ontology. Thus Fr. Benedict Ashley, and others have argued
cogently that had Thomas known that the sperm and ovum do bring about
the epigenetic primordium of the personal body, he would have favored
immediate animation, as he allowed in Christ's case. Bishop Conti has
suggested that in a contemporary context talk of successions of souls and
delayed hominization is a "threadbare scholastic argument conjured up to
give sense to a misread biology, and ought to be as firmly rejected".
After encountering in F.'s book such contemporary embryology, one
might be a little startled to find it joined to a metaphysic with such an
antique pedigree, not that newer philosophies are necessarily better. The
problem is that F. rarely, if ever, engages in the contemporary philosophical
debates on identity theory, multiplicity and counting, parts and wholes,
natural kinds, substance-kinds, essences and individuation criteria,
organismic biology, and taxonomy - even though these have immediate
bearing upon the matters he raises. One would have expected such a major
work as this to evidence more acquaintance with these contemporary
philosophical controversies and to offer some position regarding them.
Instead, F. pours the new wine of Trounson and Short's embryology into
the old wineskins of seminary Thomism.
Aristotle's and Thomas' principles are by no means unproblematical
today. F.'s assumptions that forms are reliably abstracted from substances
which instantiate natural kinds, that artificial and natural unity are easily
distinguished, that "we all know" that a crowd, herd or hive are a class and
that their members are individuals of that class, do need to be argued for
today. Can hylomorphism easily account for phenomena such as the slimemold, transplants and conjoined twins? Don't the contemporary debates
have anything to offer classical metaphysics?
There are several pro blems even with F. 's use of the unmodified classical
ontology. First, he seems to adopt an Enlightenment view of the soul which
restricts its meaning to the "mind" [A 78-9 ,130 etc.], and at no stage
addresses what it is that informs the embryo (or each distinct organism of
the "cluster of cells") before hominization at two to three weeks. This is an
extraordinary gap for one so attached to an Aristotelian-Thomistic
ontology. The theory of delayed hominization presumed a succession of
souls, and did not allow for one human soul to unite and replace several
vegetative or animal souls (each informing a distinct body), or no souls at
all, as F.'s account assumes; rather, one higher soul replaced one lower soul.
This points to a further difficulty in F.'s application of hylomorphism in
this situation. For Thomas the development of the embryo towards that
stage at which it could fittingly receive a rational soul required that it have a
single (non-rational) soul already present from fertilization directing its
gradual development for that purpose. F. denies that there is any such
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principle of unity and thus of coordinated development. Instead "a
determinate, actual human individual gradually emerges and develops from
what is potentially human and indeterminate in relation to its ultimate fate"
[AI62]. F. never gives a metaphysical (as opposed to a biological) account
of why the cells gradually organize themselves in this way. For
hylomorphism there can be no gradual emergence of unity (with things
part-unity and part-multiplicity), nor of humanity (with things part-human,
part-animal). Either a substance is a unity or not, a human being or not.
And the soul is the cause of the organization of the being, not the after-effect
as F. presumes [e.g. Al30, B64]. The reader is left with the impression that
the "soul" for F. is a spiritual component peculiar to human beings and
infused subsequent to the production of a coherent human body: a
thoroughly Cartesian view. F.'s position seems to the present writer to be
irreconcilable both with the classical metaphysical tradition and modern
adaptations of or alternatives to it.
What, then, is an individual?

Almost every page of When did I begin? refers to "ontological
individuality". It is surprising, therefore, that F. does not clearly specify in
anyone place the criteria upon which this ontological individuality is to be
assessed: instead several yardsticks are used, implicitly or explicitly, in
different parts of the book. Why these criteria are the ones which are
necessary for individuality is never explained by F., except for an assertion
that there is "universal agreement" about them [A 122]. One might instead
have adopted criteria for an individual life such as the ability to reproduce
itself: but this is a capacity a twinning embryo has even more clearly than a
newborn infant!
What is the relevance of having human genes? F. establishes convincingly
that genetic humanity is too weak a test for human individuality (gametes,
live organs and tumor are genetically human); that genetic individuality is
too strong a test (identical twin~ would fail); but (against Singer) that it is a
necessary condition for personhood [AI22]. A genetic definition of
individuality is presumed when F. argues that the possibility chimeras, with
parts derived from more than one genetic source, disproves the
individuality of the early embryo [AI44-5, 159-63, B63]. But chimeras are
no more problematical for individuality than transplants and transfusions
(where organs or blood derived from a genetically different source are
incorporated into an organism) or nutrition (where the whole or part of
even a living organism is taken into the substance of the recipient).
A second implied test is spatial oneness: that the thing be spatially distinct
from other things and not itself split into several parts separated by other
things or by space [A87-8, 122, 125, 161]. Accepting the importance of this
(not unproblematical) criterion, we find that the embryo is in fact a
(relatively) continuous unity at all stages of its development. The cells touch
and adhere to each other; until "hatching" the zona pellucid a surrounds and
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helps to hold them together. Apart from twinning they do not behave
independently in the sense of wandering off, grouping and regrouping.
Thus embryologists regard the embryo as a single multicellular organism,
not a colony of unicellular organisms. F. , however - while counting twins
apparently on the basis of spatial contiguity and discontiguity - treats the
unity of other embryos as only apparent, like adults living in close
proximity to each other.
F. regards as decisive against individuality two supposed spatio-temporal
discontinuities: that many embryonic cells never form part of the "embryo
proper"; and that in twinning one body becomes two so that neither body
can trace its existence back prior to twinning [e.g. A 121-5, B64]. But, as we
have seen, the cells destined to be part of the placenta are, in fact, always
part of the embryo proper. Like milk teeth, and indeed all cells which are
discarded during our life-time, the placenta is a collection of cells which is
dispensed with when of no further use: this does not deny its spatiotemporal continuity with the organism of which it is an organ from the
beginning until it is discarded.
As Tonti-Filippini establishes clearly (p. 42), the supposed discontinuity
in twinning provides no argument against the individuality of the greater
majority of embryos which do not twin. Most people by far can trace their
spatio-temporal chain of being back to fertilization: only before then are
there two other individuals (the gametes). How then do we account for the ·
admittedly rare monozygotic twins? Even if we accept F.'s assertion that in
twinning one embryo ceases to exist in the production oftwo "offspring", all
it means is that monozygotic twins trace their spatio-temporal identity back
to the moment of twinning; their "parent" embryo was a distinct human
organism until twinning, when it "died". In answer to F.'s objection that this
"parent" embryo lacks spatio-temporal continuity with an adult, it might be
pointed out that not only zygotes, but many fetuses , infants and children
lack this also: they die on the way. we do not conclude therefrom that they
are not individuals. Why we should draw the line at twinning, requiring that
a zygote "survive" this stage undivided, is far from clear.
A third individuality criterion introduced by F. is that the organism be
multicellular [thereby excluding the zygote by ad hoc definition] and be
differentiated and determinate in orgainzation of parts [A122]. F. again
pleads his distinction between embryonic and placental cells, this time
pointing out that in the early embryo it is indeterminate which will be
which; but it is already determined that all these cells will in fact form part of
the embryo, even if the particular organ that each will contribute to is yet to
be differentiated. The regularities of the shapes, relationships between
various constituents of the cells and between the cells, and stages of
development indicate that in the embryo we have from the beginning a high
degree of differentiation and coordination of parts. And well before F.'s
two to three week mark the cells have differentiated into inner and outer cell
masses and lost their pluripotentiality.
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Organization and soul from conception

Another test of individuality used by F. is organization of essential parts
"for the benefit, well-being, self-development and self-maintenance of the
whole individual being" [AI22-3; cf. 72,93-4,125]. A leading embryo
experimenter apparently persuaded him that in the IVF embryo "each cell
behaves as if it is significantly independent of the other cells" and that at
most the cells are only "loosely organized" [Axi-xii; cf.l48-9,175]. The
problem is, of course, how loose is "loose" and how independent is
"significantly independent"?
Some light can be cast on these questions by "organismic",
"organization" or "systems" analysis of life, common now among
philosophers of biology. According to this approach, a living organism is
not just an accidental aggregate of cooperating parts, but a functionally
interdependent, self-constructing, self-directing, self-maintaining and selfreproducing entity with a real internal unity of organization; it is
interdependently related to its environment in fulfilling these capacities.
The human zygote qualifies according to this standard, as F. sometimes
seems willing to admit [e.g. A 103, 108, 123] and Tonti-Filippini demonstrates convincingly (pp. 38-9,47).
If the cells of the early embryo are each "doing their own thing" and
"going it alone", it is remarkable that they do not each set about building
their own amnion, chorion, placenta, etc. On the contrary, unless there is
monozygotic twinning, the "group" acts throughout in the interests of the
group, not the individual cells, each cell interacting and "communicating"
in various ways with the others. The whole embryo dynamically adjusts the
balance between its parts, being programmed by what F. calls a "genetic
clock", set in its ON A from the time of fertilization , so as to develop
synchronically and grow in a coordinated way. Radical changes in internal
arrangement, and various external disturbances - even ones as drastic as
the removal of a cell in biopsy - do not break this chain of development.
The "purposive, goal-directed or teleological" character of the activities of
the embryo - its charasteristics which F. recognizes as "a group or system
of coordinatec cells" [AI 59] - suggest an organizational integrity sufficient
for individual life according to an organization-teleology criterion.
Thus we find that the early human embryo does in fact satisfy all the
individuation criteria so far isolated from F. 's work - genetic constitution,
spatial oneness, spatio-temporal continuity, differentiation of parts, selfdirecting organization. F.'s response is sometimes to deny this, but more
often simply to deny the sufficiency of each criterion, demanding that the
individuality of the organism must be established before admitting this
evidence. But this circular requirement can itself be admitted only at the
cost of denying individuality to those more mature humans which he holds
are self-evidently ontological individuals.
The organizational integrity and developmental direction of the embryo
fit in well with the view that there is a soul (the "spiritual" principle of
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organization and individuality) from conception. This approach seems to
be in the background of the Catholic Church's declarations on abortion
(1974) and artificial reproduction (1987) and its increasing insistence on
respecting the embryo as a human person from fertilization. Hence the
recent Roman decision that the serious crime of "abortion" in Canon Law
includes any deliberate terminative action against the unborn from the
moment of conception.
Fr. Ford's ultimate tests: untwinnability and unchimerability

{

The twinnability (capacity to replicate) of the early embryo is the most
crucial evidence which F . brings forward for its non-individuality. The
twinnable zygote presents the "absurd" prospect of an organism which is
both one, and more than one, human individual at the same time
[Axvi,120, 122-5,135-6]. The problem with this "straw man" argument,
however, is that no one professes it. Those who claim the twinnable embryo
is an individual usually argue that it is one individual until twinning; there
are thereafter two individuals; but at no stage is there "both one and more
than one human individual" at the same time. Like any asexually
reproducing creature, the twinnable embryo is one individual with a
potential to become two. Just as many plant and animal organisms
reproduce both sexually and asexually - and yet no one denies their
individuality - so, we now know, do human beings. Tonti-Filippini's
fundamental complaint remains unanswered: untwinnability is not a
criterion of individuality for other objects or other living species, and so
why should it be for human beings? As that critic demonstrates, F.
ultimately demands of the embryo a standard of individuality which even
adult humans could not satisfy.
Related to the untwinnability standard is F.'s requirement that an
individual not be able to fuse with another: because the early embryo can
accept cells from (or be aggregated with) another organism (= a chimera), it
is not an individual [Axvii, 139-46,159-63, B63]. Such a criterion would
disqualify from individuality much older embryos and fetuses because the
most common form of chimera in humans is the "blood chimera" where
blood cells from one fetal twin colonize another; indeed it would exclude
any organism which accepts a transplant, transfusion, foreign bacteria, or
possibly even nutrition. And today there are several experiments involving
the introduction of genetically foreign (brain, pancreas and other) stem cells
into adult patients in the hope that these cells will colonize that patient's
diseased organ, thereby creating a chimera. The capacity of patients to
receive such a colony is surely no proof that they are not individuals.
From the artificial induction of chimeras in laboratory mice F. concludes
that in natural human development embryonic cells from one or more
genetic colonies amalgamate at a later stage to form the definitive individual
human body [Axvii, 139-46, B63-4]. The leap from the bizarre to the normal
here is imprudent. One might better suggest that human chimeras, if they
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do occur, are extremely rare, the result of abnormal, diseased development,
and thus tell us little about the nature of the normal embryo.
Conclusions
F.'s work raises a number of important questions and provides some
useful answers. His collection of biological and historical information is
helpful, if needing some qualification. He provides some useful challenges
to the "Catholic" position of personhood-from-conception, by establishing
that reliance upon biological argument alone is insufficient; that genetic
uniqueness is not essential to human individuality and genetic humanness
not a sufficient proof; and that· any "homunculus" theories still lurking in
our imaginations must be purged. He also convincingly refutes some
common "non-Catholic" arguments in this debate, such as the restriction of
personhood to the viable, the brainy, or the actively reflective, and the
drawing or inferences about the nature of or proper regard for the embryo
from "the prodigality of nature" ("natural wastage").
But F.'s case against the individuality of the early human embryo fails at
several crucial points. This is not to question either the well-publicized
honesty of his efforts, nor the possibility that a more plausible case could yet
be made for delayed hominization. But a close examination of his evidence
and argument suggests to this reader "the commonly held view" that the
human individual begins at fertilization stands unshaken.
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